INTRODUCTION
Much work has been devoted recently in the social sciences to the issues of collective identities and nationalism, with a variety of approaches, from macro studies on globalisation, to micro research into the politics of self and difference. While there have been some notable geographical contributions to the debate (see: Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Keith and Pile, 1993; Paul and Moss, 1995; Watson and Gibson, 1995) , the spatial aspects of group identity formation, and particularly the impact of planning policy, settlement and migration on collective identities are yet to be fully explored.
Within that context, I pursue two main goals in this paper. First, on a theoretical level, I will endeavour to contribute to the debate on collective identities from a geographical perspective, by critically focusing on the impact of frontier settlement policies in settler states, during the course of nation-and state-building efforts. Second, on an empirical level, I wish to illustrate the theoretical arguments by exploring the Israeli case, and the impact of the settlement of the Galilee ('internal frontier') region on the formation of regional collective identities. My main argument in the paper points to the social fragmentation which is caused --paradoxically --by nation-building and state-building frontier settlement policies.
Several definitions will facilitate the discussion below. 'Ethnicity' is defined as a social bond based on belief in a common cultural past at a specific place. 'The state' is the agglomeration of public institutions and agencies charged with the implementation of public policies. 'Nationbuilding' is the deliberate effort to construct an over-arching collective identity based on a putative common national (most often ethnic) sentiment, culture and heritage. 'State-building' is a complementary project, aimed at forging social solidarity and loyalty around state institutions, territory and common interests. 'Control policies' mean the practices and regulations imposed 'from above', with the aim of reinforcing patterns of social, political and economic domination and inequality.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Nation-building and Frontier Regions
As a point of departure, we should recognise that the transformation of traditional pre-modern expressions of cultural-ethnic affiliations into contemporary forms of political organisations (nationalism and 'nation-states') is not a 'natural' process born out of linear pattern of progressive modernisation, as often argued by nationalists (see : Smith, 1995) . That transformation often entails the exercise of control and oppression by dominant groups over peripheral minorities. As shown by Connor (1992) and Penrose (1994) , the emergence of nationalism and nation-building projects has often aroused similar consciousness among minorities, who then begin to threaten vi the national-territorial cohesion espoused by the social centre (Gurr, 1993) . This in turn gives rise to a multitude of control practices and policies, aimed at preserving the dominance of majorities over the state's institutions and territory.
Levels of social control and oppression have been particularly intense when a nation-state order has been introduced into: (a) a non-European context, where the existence of a former core 'ethnie' was not clear, resulting in pervasive ethno-territorial fragmentation; and, (b) where state and ethnic boundaries did not overlap, resulting in a multiethnic state population. The construction and sharpening of national and sub-national collective identities must therefore be understood within the context of ubiquitous practices of social control. This context provides the setting for on-going dialectical dynamics between state and majority control 'from above', and popular resistance 'from below' (Mitchell, 1991; Kirby, 1993; .
Among the various models or 'waves' of nation-and state-building projects (as aptly described by Anderson, 1991; and Hobsbawm, 1990) , the case of settler states is a particularly fascinating one. In general, settler societies combine three major social groupings --a core settlers group, indigenous peoples, and subsequent migrants who attempt to join the core group. In the absence of clear historical and cultural roots, such societies have employed particularly forceful methods of nation-building, described by some as 'social engineering' (Hobsbawm, 1990) . A common public policy response to the deep divisions between the three major social groupings mentioned above (settlers, indigenous peoples and later migrants), has been the pervasive exercise of social control practices during their on-going nation-and state-building efforts. In settler societies, one such practice has been the settlement of frontier regions.
Frontier regions, which are located at the geographical, political or cultural margins of the collective, play a central role in the construction of national and state identities. Frontiers denote the (material or metaphoric) 'twilight zones' at the edge of a collective's control; they delineate directions for expansion and growth, and provide basic symbols, legends, challenges and myths used for the construction of national identity. In frontier regions the collective sharpens its identity by interacting with 'others', and by protecting the national centres, which are made selfevident by the existence of frontier developments (see: Kirby, 1993: 123-5) .
Significantly, 'internal frontiers' also play a central role in nation-and state-building. These are 'alien' areas within the collective's boundaries into which the core attempts to expand, penetrate, and increase its control (Marcuse, 1995) . Activities associated with internal frontiers may include the dissemination of national culture, the settlement of minority regions, the development of hostile natural environments, or the modernisation of 'backward' regions --all in the interest of the dominant group. The existence, 'invention' and promotion of frontier regions has formed a central pillar of identity building projects in most settler societies, such as the United States, Australia, Israel and Canada. In other post-colonial states, such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, governments have also delineated internal frontier regions, into which they have vii deliberately resettled members of the ethnic majority, in an effort to enhance state control in these regions (Newman, 1989; Mikessel and Murphy, 1991) .
Internal frontiers are usually created in regions with high concentrations of ethnic minorities, where inter-ethnic struggles occur over the control of land, power and resources. They normally evolve in two main phases which broadly correspond to the (pre-state) nation-building and statebuilding stages evident in the historical evolution of most settler societies (Kellerman, 1993) . In internal frontier regions, the majority uses the positive images and ethos of frontier development, the expansionist frontier mentality it has developed, and the power of the state apparatus, to preserve the dominance of the core group, as discussed below.
Frontier Settlement and Social Control
The settlement of frontier regions is the means by which national 'cores' use the positive political and cultural features of frontier development to aid their nation-and state-building projects. As noted by F.J. Turner (1962) , the frontier is 'both a place and a process', and frontier settlement efforts therefore provide essential physical (territorial) and spiritual (symbols, challenges, myths) assets for the fledging collective. However, it must be remembered that because the settlement of frontiers is first and foremost a project orchestrated by and for the national core for its particular interests, it involves the exercise of control and domination over peripheral groups, usually through the active involvement of the state and its supporting apparatus (see also : Foucault, 1980; Mitchell, 1991; Tilly, 1990) .
The role of the state here requires some elaboration: its involvement in the settlement process must be understood against the ethnic character of most settler states. Despite publicly espousing a secular, neutral and democratic ethos, such states have developed systems of politics and culture in the (ethnic) shape of the founding charter group. While the core culture is of course contested, the dominance of the founding ethnic group usually sets the standards for generations to come, in language, social practices, law, economics and politics (Tilly, 1990) . Subsequently, nation-building efforts will be characterised by the exclusion of the groups that fall outside the ethnic definition of the new nation (such as indigenous peoples), and by the forceful assimilation of others (such as subsequent migrants).
These processes are augmented by the capitalist economy which generally develops rapidly in settler states. Under that socioeconomic regime, later migrants are usually integrated into the production system as working classes, while indigenous peoples are initially excluded, and later integrated at even lower rungs (see : Shafir, 1993; Soja, 1995) . In the cases of both immigrants and indigenous peoples, political, economic and social control is exercised over peripheral groups, a practice clearly evident in the settlement of frontier regions.
viii We can identify three central dimensions of control embedded in the frontier settlement process, and in public policies associated with that process:
(a) an explicit attempt to dominate the land resources of indigenous peoples, thereby preventing the emergence of a peripheral counter-culture; (b) the manipulation and exploitation of governmental and societal resources channeled into frontier areas by powerful groups (such as industrialists, land developers, or ex-urbanites) for the promotion of their own narrow interests; and, (c) an implicit mechanism to dominate peripheral groups from within the 'core collective' (such as immigrants), by removing them from the centres of authority and wealth.
The last point is often neglected in the scholarly analysis of settlement policies, and even in public debates about the issue. However, it is no less significant than the dominant majorityminority tension over the control of peripheral regions. The settlement of frontiers --in the name of the 'national interest' --is often also an instrument for the preservation of hierarchical class and power relations within the ethnic majority. To illustrate the point: it was mainly poorer immigrants that settled in Australia's frontier country towns, mining areas, or agricultural stations; it was mainly Javanese peasants who were resettled in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, during Indonesia's 'transmigration programme'; it was mainly landless Sinhalese farmers who were resettled in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province as part of the government's attempt to wrest control over that region from the Tamils; and it was mainly Oriental (poorer and less educated) Jews who settled Israel's frontiers, as shown below.
In short, the development and settlement of frontier regions --beyond their nation-building and state-building functions --also serve to impose sociospatial control over weaker groups among the majority group. At times, this may only be subtly represented in the physical landscape, as opposed to the more visible oppression of indigenous peoples, but as Soja (1989: 6) observes:
We must be insistently aware of how space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life, how human geographies become filled with politics and ideology.
Frontier Regions and Collective Identities
The delineation of frontier regions and their internal dynamics of settlement, resource allocation and social control, are critical to the understanding of the formation of sub-national collective identities. The above-mentioned control practices associated with peripheral locations often generate movements of social and political resistance (Kirby, 1993) . Such movements are powerful platforms for the reinforcement or emergence of collective identities that feed on opposition to domination and exploitation (Friedmann, 1992; Paddison, 1986) .
ix
Collective identities are notoriously difficult to 'capture' in concise definitions, being malleable, dynamic and contested. However, within the shifting sands of collective identities, homeland ethnic identities (as distinct from their immigrant counterparts) have remained relatively stable (Yiftachel, 1994) . Although changes have surely taken place in these identities, like in all other social constructs, they have maintained a powerful status as prime social markers during the last century (Smith, 1986) . Homeland ethnicity denotes the identity of in-situ groups who have developed their cultural and political consciousness on the land in which they now reside.
Returning for a moment to the impact of settlement, if we take several key elements of group identities, such collective memory and forgetfulness, common interests and struggles, relations with 'others', language, culture and place (Anderson, 1991) , we find that the frontier settlement process influences each one of them. This reinforces Keith and Pile's (1993: 5-6) observation, that collective identities are born out of specific interactions between time and space', a process which creates a variety of collective 'spatialities'.
More generally, the key impact of settlement and space points to the need to understand a group's human geography, as part and parcel of its identity-construction process. As noted, the spatial factor is particularly prominent in the formulation, preservation and changing of ethnic identity (compared to class, ideological, or gender identities), given the ethnic attachment --real or mythical --to a particular place.
Further importance should be attached to the geographical setting due to its direct impact on the reproduction of collective identities. Here places, regions and communities determine to a large extent the set of opportunities, development and services available for the various groups. Quite often, institutional boundaries are raised around places and regions (such as local governments, school districts or zoning regulations) which reinforce and reproduce the typically uneven distribution of resources and opportunities. The reproduction of social and economic inequality is coupled with the intimate link between place and the production of culture (through education, customs, accents and the like) to strengthen the nexus between geography and group identity. In short, space, place and region must be understood as integral --and critical --components of the inter-generational reproduction of collective identities (Keith and Pile, 1993; Paasi, 1991; Soja, 1995) .
The above does not imply of course that places, regions and collective identities are immobile entities. On the contrary, as social constructs, they shift and change over time, as a result of technological, social, economic and political changes. Taylor (1991) demonstrates convincingly how the definition of 'regions' is far less dependent on physical-geographical features, and more on social and political circumstances and ideologies which ebb and flow over time. Similarly, Jackson and Penrose (1993) aptly show how most categories of group identity are constructed for particular purposes and interests, and are rarely born out of 'natural' or 'given' group x characteristics. The powerful forces working for the reproduction of identities and social relations must therefore be understood against the omnipresent forces of change.
In this context, the production of space and human geography, particularly in volatile frontier areas is critical if we are to grasp the total milieu in which group identities are being constructed and reproduced. Anderson's (1991) concept of 'imagined communities' is useful here --on an ethnic-regional, rather than national level. After Anderson, we can perceive state spatial policies (and the rhetoric behind such policies), and especially planning, development and settlement policies --as powerful components in the 'imagining' process of new regional communities. As Hasson (1991) also shows, frontier regions may change their image in the public discourse, first to backwater peripheries and later to desired suburbia. The change in the 'imagining' of the very same physical spaces have given rise to shifts in their populations and identities, and have served particular social interests at specific periods.
There is a rich geographical literature on the linkages between regions, places, localities and identities (for important works in this area, see, for example: Harvey, 1989; Johnston, 1991; Kirby, 1993; Markusen, 1987; Paasi, 1991; Sack, 1986; Soja, 1989) . Some of these studies observe that over-arching regional identities tend to crystallise over time, even when culturally and ethnically diverse groups have come to occupy a region. Such identities are generally born out of common territorial interests vis-à-vis the state or capital, and are reproduced and reinforced through inter-generational spatial and cultural continuity (see also: Mikessel and Murphy, 1991).
However, in cases of planned frontier settlement, which form parts of nation-building and statebuilding projects imposed on the region 'from above', such an over-arching regional identity is not likely to emerge. The bias in such strategies in favour of the interests of the majority core group often militates against the creation of inclusive struggles, cooperation and identities. This is mainly because most frontier settlement programmes are implemented by mechanisms of control, dispossession, relocation and institutional segregation for their very establishment. In such cases, (sub)regional identities are defined and sharpened by their externally-imposed territorial controls and constraints, such as land confiscation, restrictive zoning, segregation or ghettoisation. As Harvey (1993) observes, 'space must be recognised as an active constitutive component of hegemonic power: an element in the fragmentation, dislocation and weakening'.
When measures of sociospatial control are forcefully imposed by the state or a dominant majority, parallel and often conflicting regional identities emerge within the same region, leading at times to the breakdown of social and political order. The instability which may be generated by large scale (re)settlement projects and the subsequent development of parallel regional identities, is powerfully illustrated by past events in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Fiji, and most recently in parts of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
xi In overview, we can note a paradox embedded in the process of frontier settlement: while such settlement is often aimed at strengthening the nation-building project and enhancing state control and unity, it may actually sow the seeds of inter-regional fragmentation, conflict and resistance. This paradox is born, as shown above, by the spatial reproduction of collective identities, framed by uneven territorial, economic and power relations. These uneven relations produce, maintain and reproduce spatial inequalities, which, in turn, fuel resistance and conflict, rather than integration and cohesion.
Three broad observations will serve to conclude this theoretical section. First, it is vitally important to grasp the production of space as an integral part of the making, maintaining, reproducing, and questioning of collective identities. Second, spatial changes in general and frontier settlement in particular are often part of a transformation aimed at deepening social control and inequalities over peripheral groups. And third, while the settlement of internal frontier regions is an active project of imposing national identity and state unity, it may give rise to oppositional collective identities and cause societal fragmentation. These observations can now be explored and demonstrated in a specific case of a settler state and one of its frontier regions.
ISRAEL: NATION-BUILDING, STATE-BUILDING AND SETTLEMENT
Israel is a settlers' society, occupied almost entirely by Palestinian-Arabs prior to the beginning of Jewish migration about a century ago. Jews, who have had a strong religious bond to Israel, migrated into the land in a process conceptualised in a variety of ways, including 'pure settlement colonialism' (Shafir, 1993) ; 'internal-colonialism' (Zureik, 1979) or 'colonisation without colonialism ' (Aharonson, 1993) . While the scope of this paper does not allow for a full discussion of the debate over Jewish colonisation of Israel, we should note here that it was a particularly territorial, rather than an economic form of colonialism, and that it was set a-priori as a project of national identity-building (as opposed to other colonial societies, where local nationalism developed later).
Like several other settler states, however, Israeli society is marked by three dominant social groupings, as mentioned earlier: a core settlers group (chiefly Ashkenazi-European Jews), indigenous people (Palestinian-Arabs) and subsequent migrants (mainly Oriental Jews from Middle Eastern countries). The current ethnic composition of Israel was largely determined during the 1948 war, when 80 percent of the Arab population fled or was driven out, while Jewish refugees arrived from Europe, and later from Middle Eastern countries. Most of the Arabs living in Israel have resided in the country for centuries, while the bulk of Ashkenazi Jews arrived during the pre-state period and immediately after 1948. This ethnic group was recently strengthened by the addition of 600,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union, who arrived during the last five years. Most Oriental Jews arrived in Israel in the early 1950s, as immigrants of xii relatively low socioeconomic status who joined an already established state and culture (Smooha, 1993) . At the end of 1994, the Ashkenazi group formed 44 percent of Israel's 5.5. million citizens, the Oriental Jewish group 40 percent, and the Arabs 16 percent (CBS, 1995) .
Israeli nation-building has been a calculated project of establishing a national-territorial identity, based on a reconstructed 'imagined' Jewish ethnie, thereby excluding indigenous Arabs (Smooha, 1990) . Israeli state-building has been a complementary project of establishing territorial and institutional infrastructures for the 'reviving' nation, affecting all state residents, including the Arabs (Kimmerling, 1993) . Significantly, though, because the Zionist project took place in a non-European, and multi-ethnic setting, Israeli nation-and state-building have been both characterised by varying strategies of social control over Arab and Jewish minorities (for more on Israel's ethnic structure, see: Horowitz and Lissak, 1990; Peled, 1990; Smooha, 1993; Swirski, 1981; Waterman, 1990; Weingrod, 1985) . A central practice in this strategy of social control, as shown below, was the settlement of the frontiers.
Jewish settlement in Israel has formed a central pillar in the construction of a new Zionist (that is, Hebrew) national collective identity. It performed the two classical functions of frontier settlement: providing the collective with both territorial and spiritual foundations to consolidate the new identity. It also provided a unifying cause for Jews from different backgrounds, fostered and enhanced altruistic values such as pioneering, personal sacrifice, remoteness and danger; created consensus and public legitimation for the allocation of massive resources for the establishment of (non-economic) new settlements; and presented a focus for world Jewry identification, essential for the financial viability of the state (see : Rabinowitz, 1992; Shafir, 1993) .
However, frontier settlement has also created divisions within nation and state, most notably by constituting an instrument for the oppression of the Arab minority, but also by working to differentiate and segregate various Jewish groups. The use of Jewish settlement vis-à-vis the Arabs in Israel has been premised on the notion that control over the Arab minority is the most effective means of preserving political stability. Israeli settlement and spatial policies have consequently de-territorialised the Arab minority, and retarded its political, economic and cultural development (see : Kimmerling, 1983; Yiftachel, 1995) .
The use of settlement and spatial policy as control mechanisms within the Jewish population was more subtle, but no less significant. That process mainly entailed the distribution of Oriental Jews into development towns and moshavim at the country's northern and particularly southern peripheries, and the subsequent preservation of socioeconomic gaps, by development and housing policies which assisted the centre at the expense of the periphery. The above processes have been clearly illustrated by the settlement of the Galilee.
xiii The Galilee: Settlement of an Internal Frontier and Imposition of Social Control
The 'Hills of Galilee' area (Galil Harrari) is termed here as the Galilee. It is a typical frontier region, being adjacent to Israel's northern border, and populated mainly by Palestinian Arabs (see Figure 1) . At the end of 1994, that region accommodated 680,000 residents, of which 72 percent were Arab, 21 percent residents of development towns and 9 percent residents of rural and exurban kibbutzim, moshavim and mitzpim.
During the 1948 war, the Galilee was conquered by Jewish forces, after being designated as part of the Arab state in the 1947 UN Partition Resolution 181. Ever Jews since populating the region ('Judaisation of Galilee') have received the highest priority by successive Israeli governments, in rhetoric, publications, policies, resources and development. Since the beginning of Jewish settlement in Israel in the late nineteenth century, the Galilee was considered a frontier by the Jewish collective. However, given its decisive Arab majority, it did not receive exceptional attention among the Jewish public until independence. Since then, however, the Galilee has received the status of an 'internal frontier', endowing Jewish settlement in the region with total Jewish consensus, legitimacy and status.
Three main waves of Jewish settlements in the Galilee can be discerned. In the first wave (not analysed in this paper), during the 1949-52 period, some 22 kibbutzim (communal farms) and moshavim (semi-communal farms) were built, mainly along the international borders. In the second wave, during the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, four development towns and eight moshavim were built and populated mainly by new Jewish immigrants from Middle Eastern countries; during that wave, Shlomi, Ma'alot, Natzrat Illit, and Migdal Ha'emek were built, with the addition of Carmiel and the expansion of Zefad in the mid-1960s (Figure 1 ). It is during that period that large numbers of Jews from low socioeconomic backgrounds, were provided housing in the development towns and the moshavim, thereby leaving them little option but to settle there. Given the social and political weakness of the development towns within the Israeli state, Hasson (1991) observes that their regions have been transformed 'from frontiers to peripheries'.
The third wave, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, saw the establishment of 52 small exurban communities known as 'mitzpim', scattered thinly in between the Arab villages of the region (Figure 1) . While the establishment of the mitzpim was 'marketed' in the public as a renewed effort to settle the internal frontier (using the rhetoric that Arabs are 'invading' state lands --see Jewish Agency, 1978) , the people migrating into these small settlements were mainly middle class Ashkenazi suburbanites. Most of the mitzpim also developed as highly attractive single-residential neighbourhoods, with high standards of public amenities and a pleasant physical environment. xiv Significantly, the social differences characterising the three waves of settlements in the region (and in Israel as a whole), were enshrined by institutional development. This was evident in the segregation of local governments between kibbutzim, moshavim, development towns and mitzpim. As shown by Newman (1995) , the creation of 'homogenous spaces' was tolerated and even supported by the Israeli authorities, leading to extreme cases of 'gerrymandering' and a most distorted political organisation of space (see Figure 2) .
Further, the kibbutzim and moshavim belonged to national organisations which provided them with many essential services and items of consumption, at the expense of development towns, where business and industry languished. 1 Given the concentration of capital and political clout in Israel's coastal plain, the main function of the development towns and the Arab villages in the Galilee became the provision of cheap labour to large labour-intensive industries. The institutional separation continued with the third wave of settlement, with most mitzpim being grouped under one exclusive local government area (the Misgav council --see Figure 2 ).
The strategies and practices evident in the settlement of the Galilee internal frontier, and the three waves of Jewish settlers, with their marked social differences, have naturally created a particular sociospatial dynamic in the region. Given the regional mix of the three main groups, their varying circumstances of living in the region, and the uneven power and economic distribution, group relations in the region have evolved along two main dimensions: Arab-Jewish, and AshkenaziOriental. 2
The Arab-Jewish Dimension: The function of settlement policies in the Galilee for the control and oppression of the Arab minority has been apparent in several key areas, documented in detail by previous studies (Carmon et al., 1991; Kipnis, 1987; Soffer and Finkel, 1988; Yiftachel, 1993) . Suffice to say here that they worked to bisect Arab regional territoriality, reduce Arab land holding, and neglect Arab villages in most matters of state-induced development and infrastructure (Figure 1 ).
The Palestinian Arabs in the Galilee have therefore been continuously exposed to Jewish attempts to strengthen and deepen their territorial, economic and political control in the region. While small benefits have flowed to the Arabs in the region (especially in the form of improved regional roads and employment opportunities), they have been generally oppressed, ignored, or marginalised, with Jewish interests taking precedence in nearly all policy initiatives. In recent years, following waves of Jewish settlement and land expropriation, the expansion of Jewish control in the region has become more subtle, finding expression through the expansion of Jewish municipal areas over Arab-owned land, the placement of state economic development efforts in Jewish towns and settlements, and the continuing concentration of (semi-nomad) Bedouins into planned villages.
xv
The Ashkenazi-Oriental Jewish Dimension: Within the Jewish population, the functioning of spatial and settlement policies as an instrument of social control rested on two key spatial strategies. First was the confinement of weak Jewish populations (particularly from Oriental origins) to isolated development towns (and moshavim, on which there is no room to elaborate in this paper). The development towns, through on-going housing, social service and employment policies, quickly became dependent on hand-outs and initiatives from the national core. Many of the towns' residents became 'trapped' by a stagnant real-estate market, and lower levels of training and social networks, which worked to limit their socioeconomic mobility. The recent addition of Soviet immigrants to the development towns, despite affecting rapid growth in population, did not change the prevailing socioeconomic profile of the towns. This has occurred because development towns mainly attracted weak segments from among the new immigrants (with the possible exception of Carmiel).
Second was the more recent use of 'segregation mechanisms' by residents of the mitzpim. The mitzpim were built some 15 years ago under the guise of Judaising the Galilee, but in effect were used by well-organised middle-class populations to fulfill their suburban aspirations, supported by public resources. The transformation 'from frontier to suburbia' became possible due to the growing geographical accessibility of the Galilee, to urban centres on the coastal plain, and the rising level of mobility among Israeli members of the professional classes.
In order to create the most attractive suburban social environment, the mitzpim widely employed 'resident screening procedures' to select only 'appropriate' candidates to their settlements. The use of these procedures predictably resulted in the mitzpim population having extremely high socioeconomic characteristics (Table 1) . Notably, these procedures were originally developed to screen candidates for the pioneering socialist and highly ideological kibbutzim and moshavim, during the early years of Jewish nation-building.
The mitzpim settlement, despite using some of the rhetoric of the early settlers, were mainly little more than ex-urbanites and suburbanites, of the type identified by Cloke and Little (1990) as 'rural gentrifiers'. This was reinforced by a recent survey in which 91 percent of mitzpim residents cited reasons, such as quality of housing and better living environment, as reasons for migrating to the mitzpim (Carmon et al, 1991: 101) . A key point for the present analysis, is that the nation-building mechanisms of screening pioneers were now manipulated to create elitist enclaves with the aid of public institutions, legal powers and resources.
Finally, as briefly noted above, most of the mitzpim settlements have organised to create their local government units, which reinforce the segregated nature of these settlements, by enshrining high residential standards and very low densities in their outline statutory plans. This has the effect of creating 'fiscal walls' to reinforce the institutional constraints outlined above. In addition, the grouping of most mitzpim in the one regional council (Misgav -- Figure 2 ) created xvi largely independent modes of cultural, educational and service activities from the neighbouring development towns.
Recent demographic data attest to the significant gaps in levels of social development between the mitzpim, the development towns, and their Arab neighbours (Table 1 ). Figure 2 also shows that these social differences have been translated into clear patterns of territorial domination: municipalities with Ashkenazi majority cover 62.3 percent of the local government area in the Galilee (with only 6 percent of the population); these with Oriental-Jewish majority cover 21.5 percent (with 24 percent of the population); while Arab municipalities cover only 16.1 percent of the area (with 72 percent of the population). It is to the impact of these differences and inequalities on the formation of collective identities that we now turn.
Collective Identities in the Frontier
A central element to be pointed out of the parallel development and institutional strategies described here, is the use of nation-building and frontier development mechanisms to create and maintain a highly uneven socio-spatial structure. Israeli settlement and spatial policies, in the name of nation-and state-building projects, have therefore created three separate and distinctive development paths within a single region: Arab villages have become 'internal frontiers', development towns have become 'peripheral frontiers' and the mitzpim have become 'suburban frontiers'.
These separate development paths have formed the bases for the emergence and reproduction of several interwoven, competing, but largely mutually exclusive regional identities. Clearly, these identities are based on previous group differences, which had long preceded the implementation of settlement policies in the Galilee. However, the 'grounding' of these identities in specific ethnically-defined places by Israeli policies has worked to perpetuate group differences, against trends of (partial) social integration elsewhere in the country. The new settlement geography of the region has therefore remoulded and reinforced the historical differences into new and distinct forms of social groupings. This is supported by quantitative and qualitative data which were collected from the region's residents on their reactions to the socio-spatial processes outlined above in a range of studies (see : Ben Zadok, 1993; Carmon et al., 1991; Falah, 1989; Kipnis, 1989; Yiftachel, 1992 Yiftachel, , 1995 . The data collected by these studies on attitudes, protest, voting, patterns of inter-ethnic contact, and self-perception, indicate different reactions among residents of the Galilee to the sociospatial processes outlined above. Popular resistance has developed among Arabs in the region, a quiet --if uneasy --acceptance has been noticed among residents of the development towns (with early signs of organised resistance), and a high level of satisfaction was traced among mitzpim residents.
xvii Further analysis of the reactions to the evolving regional geography among the three sectors, point to the emergence and preservation of three key group identities within the single region. Their aspirations, behavioural patterns, and attitudes towards the state and its policies, and towards other residential groups in the region, indicates not only the existence of distinctive collective identities, but also the perceptions among most residents that largely impregnable boundaries separate these identities. While acknowledging that important variations do exist within each collective, we can still identify three main regional identities which now dominate the 'ethnic landscape' in the Galilee:
(a) An ethnonational regional identity among Palestinian-Arabs. Palestinian-Arab collective identity in the Galilee is based on the common memory of loss. This distinctive identity obviously draws on the deep historical roots of Palestinian-Arabs in the region, but also on the dispossession and deprivation suffered by Arabs within the Israeli state. Its contemporary expression is characterised by attitudes and protest which focus on three themes of relatively equal importance: land loss, Palestinian identity-building, and socioeconomic inequality. The intensification of protest and the rallying around the above three issues differentiate the Palestinian-Arabs in the Galilee from both their brethren in the occupied territories (where a fully fledged Palestinian nationalism has developed), and from the underprivileged Jews in the region (where an ethno-class consciousness has developed). Their fledging identity is most similar to Palestinians in the 'Triangle' region, who are faced with very similar socio-spatial processes.
Palestinian-Arab regionalism in the Galilee is therefore developing around a uni-ethnic struggle for improving their spatial, economic and political situation in the region and beyond. It also pursues the gradual construction of a Palestinian identity, but within the Israeli state. It is a good illustration of how collective identities can be shaped by their constraining political and spatial structures, as shown by the following statement from a notable Palestinian local government leader in the region:
Israel has taken our land, surrounded us with Jewish settlements, and made us feel like strangers in our homeland. . . the Israelis do not realise, however, that we are here to stay, that we are here to struggle for our rights, and that we will not give up our identity as Palestinian Arabs and our rights as Israelis. . . the more they take from us, the more we fight. . .
(b) A lower middle-class 'peripheral' identity among (mainly Oriental) Jews. This collective identity is founded on the common memory of immigrant deprivation. It characterises residents of the region's development towns and moshavim and can thus be understood as an ethno-class identity. It is marked by a strong desire to assimilate and integrate into the 'core Israeli culture', a pervasive feeling of deprivation vis-à-vis the national centre, and a drive for improved standards of living. The prevailing attitudes among this group show suspicion of, and some hostility towards, the surrounding Arab and Jewish settlements. Their attitudes towards xviii Arab-Jewish relations are particularly intransigent. This nascent identity is illustrated by the following statement made by a councilor from Ma'alot:
It was us who 'Judaised' the Galilee in the 1950s; it was us who suffered long years of living in the 'sticks' with high unemployment and little to do; it was us who lived among the Arabs and suffered from their violence [referring to the PLO Ma'alot massacre of 1972 -O.Y.]. . . and now, when it's easy and fashionable to live here, they [the Ashkenazi -O.Y.] come, build pretty neighbourhoods in the best locations, take our best families and students, and leave us --again --with nothing.
(c) A middle-class suburban identity among (mainly Ashkenazi) mitzpim Jews, This collective identity is based on a common affiliation with a dominant 'core' Jewish-Ashkenazi collective in Israel. It can thus be understood as elitist and suburban, being characterised by a drive for improved standards of living, the creation of homogeneous neighbourhoods, and the control over their own local governments (see: Carmon et al., 1991; Kipnis, 1989) . The prevailing attitudes among this group show parallel strands of liberalism, ethnocentrism and indifference to the surrounding human landscape. Their attitudes towards Arab-Jewish relations are fairly moderate. However, they maintain a desire to segregate their living, recreational and cultural environments from both the Arabs, and from development towns and moshavim in the region (Yiftachel and Carmon, 1995) . This was well summarised by the Head of one of the mitzpim local government committees, in response to a proposition to have mixed schooling for mitzpim children with children from neighbouring moshavim and towns:
The residents of the mitzpim have a philosophy of 'live and let live'. . . we are happy for everybody to do well in the Galilee. . . however, we came here to live in small settlements, in a good quality of environment, and with compatible people. . . it will not be acceptable for us, or for our children, to mix with people who do not live like us, and do not think like us. . . Clearly, variations do exist within each group, and changes are to be expected as oppressed groups attempt to resist and contest their situation. Further, the three identities noted above, were not --of course --wholly created by the settlement process. They were constructed on the basis of pre-existing identities, born out of many historical and cultural 'layers'. The settlement process has mainly reinforced, reshaped and reproduced these identities against the background of countervailing forces of integration and assimilation The continuous prominence of these collective identities in the Galilee, and their high visibility in the region's segregated landscape, provides clear evidence to the potency of settlement, space and place, in the continuous reproduction of social relations and identities.
xix
A BRIEF CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to articulate a critical geographical contribution to the debate on collective identities and nation-building, highlighting the specific case of ethnic groups in frontier regions. In such regions the core collective attempts to expand its control over peripheral groups, by the use of settlement, development and institutional practices, even though these very practices were shown to sow the seeds of fragmentation and division. The case of the Galilee region has shown deep sociospatial cleavages which have been reinforced by the settlement process, mainly between Jews and Arabs, and between Ashkenazi and Oriental Jews.
The emergence and preservation of three clear collective identities within the Galilee may of course be of intrinsic interest for students of Israeli society. However, for the broader theoretical discussion on the formation of collective identities, the main interest lies in the manner in which Israeli nation-and state-building efforts, through the agency of settlement strategies and spatial control policies, have given rise to the formation of hierarchical and relatively impregnable collective identities within a single region.
National and ethnic origins, class affiliation, locational and institutional factors have therefore all played critical roles in the shaping of collective identities in the Galilee. We have particularly seen how the identity-building projects (nation-and state-building), through their articulation in space, have contributed significantly to the emergence of a regional geography of tension and conflict. In other words, and paradoxically: The macro-projects of creating national and state-identities have given rise to regional sociospatial processes which may undermine the goals of the original macro-projects! xx
Notes
[1] For lack of space, the discussion below will not delve further into the case of the kibbutzim and moshavim (for analysis of the representation of kibbutzim in the frontier, see : Hasson, 1991) .
[2] The third possible dimension of Oriental Jews -Arabs has played a less important role in the shaping of social relations in the region, because of the weak political and economic position of the two groups, and their parallel dependence on the Israeli centre (for analyses of that dimension, see: Peled, 1990; Rabinowitz, 1992) .
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